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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that the passage of the Anti-Secession law in March 2005 was 
a logical step forward by the Chinese to restore what they perceived as an 
imbalance of power across the Taiwan Strait. A chain of events prior to the bill 
suggested that Taiwan had gained an upper hand with regards to the Taiwan 
issue due mainly to the developing US — Taiwan relationship and Taiwan′s 
strong pro-independence position under the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP). The passage of the Anti-Secession law told the world that China would not 
allow Taiwan to secede and that the Chinese were willing to fight for this cause. 
The Chinese have long held the position that Taiwan is part of China. They 
consider reunification with Taiwan to be a principled issue of national unity, 
sovereignty and territorial integration of the motherland, an issue of critical 
importance to China′s national interest. The election of Ma Ying-Jeou as Taiwan′s 
President in March 2008 was at least marked by a temporary reduction of tension 
across the straits. However, the new president′s efforts to foster a closer 
relationship with mainland China have not generated as much of a positive 
impact. Hence, tension across the Taiwan Strait remains intense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
On 17 December 2004, the Standing Committee of the Chinese National 
People's Congress (NPC) announced the inclusion of the Anti-Secession law 
in its legislative agenda for the March 2005 session. A draft of the law was 
submitted for consideration in the 25–29 December 2004 NPC Standing 
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Committee Session. The Anti-Secession Law was passed in the third session 
of the NPC on 14 March 2005 by 2,896 votes to zero votes with two 
abstentions. From China's perspective, the law aimed to reassert the aim of a 
peaceful reunification between Taiwan and the mainland. As Premier Wen 
Jiabao said, "It is not a law for war but for the peaceful reunification of the 
motherland". He added, "so long as there is a glimmer hope for peaceful 
reunification, we will exert our utmost to make it happen rather than give 
up". The law came into enforcement on 14 March 2005 when President Hu 
Jintao signed the presidential order. 
The Chinese politicians and media repeatedly highlighted the fact that 
merely two of the ten articles (Article 8 and Article 9) emphasised the 
possibility of using non-peaceful means. Article 8 in particular states that 
the Chinese state "shall employ non-peaceful means" in three contexts if 
Taiwan secedes, if "major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China 
should occur", or if the "possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be 
completely exhausted". Three-fourths of the Anti-Secession law were 
devoted to the promotion of a peaceful unification of Taiwan and the 
motherland and the development of bilateral ties. In contrast, former Taiwan 
President Chen Shui-bian claimed on 16 March 2005 that the Anti-
Secession law was an "invasive" bill and a "law of aggression". Chen's 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its ally, the Taiwan Solidarity 
Union (TSU), portrayed the law as "a war mobilisation order" to authorise 
the Mainland to attack Taiwan at any time (Xing 2005). The DPP and TSU 
led a demonstration in Taipei on 26 March 2005 to protest the law. DPP's 
Chen Shui-bian, Annette Lu, Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-Chang and former 
President Lee Teng-hui participated in the demonstration, while opposition 
parties like Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP) and the New 
Party were absent, although some of their supporters joined the march. 
The Anti-Secession Law reaffirms China's position on One-China 
policy, a domestic declaration that Taiwan is part of China. Taiwan has 
rejected it categorically, claiming that all issues, including the One-China 
policy should be negotiated without any preconditions. The Anti-Secession 
Law was not intended to achieve unification across the Taiwan Strait per se, 
although China is insisting that Taiwan must eventually reunify with China. 
For example, by changing the title of the law from the proposed National 
Reunification Law and not inserting a timetable for eventual reunification, 
Beijing indicates that it prefers maintaining the status quo to resolving the 
Taiwan problem hurriedly. This could be the result of possible military 
confrontation with the US and China's preoccupation with strengthening its 
economic power (Bellows 2005; Tang 2006).  
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This paper argues that the passage of the Anti-Secession law by 
mainland China was a measure intended to restore the balance of power 
across the Taiwan Strait. A chain of events prior to the bill suggested that 
Taiwan had gained an upper hand with regards to the Taiwan issue due 
mainly to the improved US — Taiwan relationship (which strengthened pro-
independence movements) and the Taiwanese's own commitment to 
expanding their military capabilities and establishing a new Taiwanese 
identity. The passage of the Anti-Secession law told the world that China 
would not allow Taiwan to secede. The paper further asks whether the 
objective of the Anti-Secession Law has been met. The Balance of Power 
theory stipulates that security is enhanced when military power is 
distributed fairly evenly to prevent a single hegemon or bloc from 
controlling the region. Hence, success in the context of the Balance of 
Power theory translates into stability in the cross strait, although it does not 
mean a complete absence of tension. By concentrating on the 5-year period 
following the passage of the Anti-Secession Law, this paper traces the 
development of cross-strait relations, including the period of power 
transition in Taiwan from Chen to Ma Ying-jeou. The paper concludes that 
the Balance of Power theory is largely supported. It argues that the Anti-
Secession Law helped to stabilise cross-strait relations during the 2005–
2008 period, in which the Chen government remained in power although the 
muted support for Chen from the US played a role as well. Tension, 
however, remains. The election of Ma Ying-Jeou as Taiwan's President in 
March 2008 has at least been marked by a temporary reduction of tension 
across the Taiwan Strait, attributed almost exclusively to Ma's efforts to 
strengthen economic relations between mainland China and Taiwan. 
However, his efforts to foster a closer relationship with mainland China 
have not generated as much positive impact as one might have expected. 
Bearing in mind that the 2012 Presidential Election in Taiwan is not too far 
away, granting too many concessions to Taiwan may create a backlash for 
mainland China if Beijing wants to revoke those concessions in the event 
that a less China-friendly political leader replaces Ma. The drop in 
popularity for Ma in Taiwan further raised doubts about the possibility of 
significant changes in China-Taiwan relations.
1
 
The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner: Section 2 
provides a theoretical overview with particular reference to the doctrine of 
realism. Section 3 revisits the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the US-
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Ma's popularity fell to a record low of 29% in August 2009 following the Morakot typhoon, which hit 
Taiwan in the same month http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=114& 
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PRC Joint Communiqué of 1982. It identifies some areas of inconsistency in 
the US position on the Taiwan issue and illustrates the US's (particularly the 
US Congress's) continued support for Taiwan. Taiwan's own commitment to 
strengthening its military capabilities and promoting the view that 
Taiwanese are a distinctive community has caused further discomfort in 
Beijing. Both developments, as Section 4 argues, formed the justification for 
mainland China to expand its military capabilities and push ahead the Anti-
Secession Law as a means to restore the balance of power. Section 5 
describes the events following the passage of the law to ascertain the extent 
to which the law has met its objectives. Section 6 provides conclusion. 
 
 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 
Walt (1998: 29) claims that theories are needed "to make sense of the 
blizzard of information that bombards us daily".
 
In the context of 
International Relations (IR), realism represents a major theory.
2
 Realists 
view individuals and nation-states as self-interested actors that carry out 
cost-benefit analyses of all alternatives available to them so that they can 
choose the alternative that yields the highest net benefit. However, they may 
miscalculate from time to time because they operate in an environment with 
imperfect information. States are unitary in realism. This implies that any 
differences in viewpoints among political leaders or bureaucracies within 
the state are "ultimately resolved so that the state speaks with one voice" 
(Viotti and Kauppi 1998: 55). Exceptions to this practice are in relation to 
either trivial issues or relatively more serious issues that are corrected in 
"due course by the leadership" (Ibid.). The realist perspective is applicable 
to China-Taiwan relations to the extent that under conditions of uncertainty, 
the means of ensurung their independence is military power. China's 
military capability is much superior to Taiwan's, although the possible 
involvement of the US in military confrontations potentially rebalances the 
equation. 
Realists argue that nation-states are concerned with relative power 
rather than absolute power. In effect, realism assumes different contexts of 
relative power; major powers, for example, compete to alter major powers, 
while regional powers seek to alter regional powers and so on. Even during 
peace time, countries are inclined to gain military power through arms 
control so as to deal with potential threats capable of undermining their 
                                                 
2
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For an exposition of how other IR theories might be relevant, see Acharya (1999) and Friedberg (2005). 
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relative power. The need to do so derives from the argument that the world 
is anarchical. By this, realists suggest that there are no global governing 
bodies capable of maintaining peace at all times or preventing some states 
from attacking other states/each other. States claim their independent right 
and enact laws to maintain their sovereignty. In an anarchical system, a state 
under attack may not be able to seek help from other states. Even if it can, 
there is no guarantee that it will secure good help. As a consequence, it is 
necessary for states to adopt the self-help system, to build and use their own 
military force whenever necessary. As a state expands its military 
competencies, other nations' security is threatened because increased 
stability and power in one state translates to greater instability in other 
states. Realists term this phenomenon the security dilemma.  
To neo-realists, the structure of the international system compels 
states to strengthen their power to survive in the anarchical system. They 
identify the characteristics of a system according to the distribution of 
power or capabilities among states categorised as unipolar, bipolar or 
multipolar. Polarity is measured in the number of great powers. The Cold 
War period was characterised by a bipolar system, with the US and the 
Soviet Union as the two great powers. When the Cold War ended, the USA 
emerged as the sole great power. The relevance of China is that the rise of 
China might be seen as the most plausible challenge to a hegemonic or 
unipolar position for the US. Whether one refers to Zakaria's (2008) "Post-
American World" or Mahbubani's (2008) "New Asian Hemisphere", a 
common feature prevails: China will play an increasingly prominent role in 
defining the world order in the twenty-first century. The combined and 
increasing economic and military might of the Chinese enhance their 
ambitions for Taiwan such that even the superior American conventional 
forces cannot deter them.  
According to Waltz (2002: 30), competition is more complicated in a 
multipolar system "because uncertainties about the comparative capabilities 
of states multiply as numbers grow, and because estimates of the 
cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make". In a bipolar 
system, on the other hand, each is bound to focus its fears on the other, 
encouraging the states to behave defensively to maintain the balance of 
power. Mersheimer (1998: 339) argues that it was the balance of power 
between the US and the Soviet Union that provided the key to stability 
during the cold war, not NATO per se. With the Soviet Union collapsed, 
NATO must either "disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new 
distribution of power in Europe" (Ibid.). Waltz's "structural realism" 
assumes that great powers are not inherently aggressive; Waltz starts by 
assuming that states merely seek security to survive. Anarchy encourages 
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states to seek power because power is the best means to survival. Although 
it is never known in reality whether there is an equal distribution of power, 
the important thing is that there is recognition of balancing behaviour 
among the nation-states. Balancing is a process, not an outcome. Because 
the US is a great power, the entry of the US and its commitment to 
protecting Taiwan complicates the Taiwan issue. This will necessarily mean 
friction because both China and the US have their own conception of what 
is the right thing for Taiwan. A situation involving three actors is inherently 
unstable because of the difficulties in accurately assessing the balance. If 
US—Taiwan relations are believed to be strong, Taiwan may bid for 
independence now rather than at some point in the future when Chinese 
military capabilities have expanded even further, possibly triggering other 
secessionist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. A neo-
realist response to the situation would be for the Chinese to rebalance the 
triangle with measures such as weapons acquisition and the passage of the 
Anti-Secession law.  
It is also useful to note that the realists have a less rosy view of the 
idea of economic integration as a promoter of peace. In this way, they are 
unlike the economic liberals who have argued that the expansion of 
economic linkages promotes a dense network of communication to reduce 
misunderstanding and foster peaceful commercial exchanges (Deutsch et al. 
1957). To the realists, trade produces relations of dependence, which can 
create a great amount of conflict. For example, economic integration can 
raise the likelihood of military confrontation among trading nations as they 
seek to gain or maintain their access to vital resources to acquire wealth and 
power in an anarchical society (Waltz 1979). In the case of China, it is true 
that the mainland has pledged to take on a more responsible role as a 
member of the international community. In particular, China′s economic 
integration with the world since the late 1970s may correspondingly reduce 
its willingness to use force and coercion. However, the passage of the Anti-
Secession law as recently as 2005 and the nuclear arms threat by Chinese 
generals challenge this notion. China's rapidly growing economy has made 
it easy for it to strengthen its military capabilities, as indicated by the 
growth in China's spending in arms and weapons. As state capabilities 
expand, leaders define their interests more expansively and seek to influence 
what is going on around them. The use of the term "peaceful rise" by the 
Chinese further alluded to the Chinese expansion of power in the global 
arena. As reported in Cho and Jeong (2008: 469), the use of the term 
"peaceful rise" and not "peaceful development" indicated the shift in the 
power balance between states; "China′s rise in international politics signifies 
the relative weakening of the leadership of superpowers such as the US and 
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Japan, while China's development implies the possibility of parallel 
development with existing superpowers".  
Realism has been utilised to explain the cross-strait situation 
(Acharya 1999; Christensen 2001; Friedberg 2005; Ross 2006). This paper 
follows the line of argument proposed in the realism doctrine, paying 
particular attention to the Anti-Secession Law and the events surrounding its 
passage. The law warns of the consequences of the Republic of China's 
(ROC) declaring independence. Independence in the ROC context means 
the granting of diplomatic recognition by the international community 
and/or a constitutional change in the ROC to create a political entity distinct 
from the government that has been ruling Taiwan since 1949. This would 
involve changing the regime′s name and redefining its territorial boundaries, 
which are technical issues behind the declaration of independence. Each 
type of independence is unlikely to be successful without the support of the 
US. It is therefore constructive to analyse US — Taiwan relations. 
 
 
US-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Richard Nixon's visit to China from 21–28 February 1972, during his first 
presidential administration (1969–1973), began a decade-long normalisation 
process for Washington and Beijing. During the visit, Deng Xiaoping asked 
the US to comply with three conditions in exchange for China's agreeing to 
the mutual establishment of diplomatic relations: (i) the removal of all 
American forces from Taiwan, (ii) the end of all official government ties 
and (iii) the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defence Treaty between the US 
and the ROC. From 1973–1978, the USA and China each maintained a non-
diplomatic liaison office in the other's capital. On 15 December 1978, the 
Carter administration agreed to Deng's demand and recognised the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) as the sole representative of China. US would 
maintain only informal culture and commercial relations with the ROC. The 
agreement was later expressed in the US-PRC Joint Communiqué signed on 
17 August 1982 during the Reagan presidency. In the communiqué, the US 
agreed to withdraw all military forces from Taiwan, and there would be no 
more official relationship with Taiwan following normalisation with China. 
The US only agreed to cease arms sales to Taiwan from 1980 onwards. The 
reason, according to Feldman (1998), was that the US wanted to preserve its 
national dignity by complying with previously engaged contracts and 
agreements.  
Internally, the US Congress embarked on the journey to draft a law, 
realising that the State Department Bill that stated the Carter 
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administration's commitment to Beijing had said nothing about the security 
of Taiwan and its people. The US Congress wanted to correct the perceived 
problem through legislative action, and this resulted in the passage of the 
Taiwan Relations Act. The Act made changes to Carter′s earlier 
commitments. For example, the act stipulated that arms would be made 
available to Taiwan "in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan 
to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability" and thus opposed Carter's 
agreement with Beijing that the US would not sell further arms to Taiwan 
from 1980 onwards.
3
 The Taiwan Relations Act signaled to China that the 
US was monitoring the situation and contested China's contention that the 
Taiwan issue was an internal matter to be solved by the Chinese from both 
sides.
4
  
There were some indications of the US's adhering to the US-PRC 
Joint Communiqué in the early years, as seen in the drop in arms sales to 
Taiwan from USD800 million in 1983 to USD660 million in 1990. 
However, thereafter, the assistance provided to the island increased 
remarkably. In 1992, for example, Washington agreed to sell 150 F-16 
fighter aircrafts to Taiwan. On 22 February 2000, the US Congress passed 
the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act to strengthen US-Taiwan military 
relations through deeper interaction related to operational matters and 
military training. In April 2001, with the support of the Taiwan Security 
Enhancement Act, the Bush administration offered arms to Taiwan that 
were more extensive in terms of both quantity and quality. The offer was 
unusually large, comprised of eight diesel-electric submarines, four Kidd-
Class guided missile destroyers, and twelve P-3C petrol and anti-submarine 
aircrafts, along with 155 mm howitzers, minesweeping helicopters, 
torpedoes, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and amphibious assault vehicles. The 
two-decade ban on sales of submarines to Taiwan was lifted. After the April 
2001 offer, the US encouraged Taiwan to buy even more weapons, 
including the Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile system, advanced ground-based 
and satellite-based radars, and a C4ISR (command, control, 
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance' and reconnaissance) 
network that would allow Taiwan's different armed services to share real-
time data. The USA intended to offer the Taiwanese military weapons that 
                                                 
3
  The situation reflects the power of a subgroup as opposed to the paradigm of unitary states in the realm 
of foreign policy as supported by the realists. See Sterling-Folker and Shinko (2005) for more on this 
topic. 
4
  Feldman (1998) reported that Carter was not pleased with the act when it was placed on his desk. He 
considered vetoing the bill but was advised that the votes in the House (339–350) and the Senate (85–94) 
indicated that "such a veto probably would be overridden. In the end he signed it".  
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would "give Taiwan potent offensive strike capabilities to attack targets on 
the Chinese mainland" (Swaine 2004: 8; emphasis added). 
Besides providing major weapons and support systems, the US 
Department of Defence conducted over a dozen assessments and 
simulations to study Taiwan's ability to defend itself against air attacks, 
naval blockages and military landings.
5
 The US sent representatives to 
Taiwan during the latter's annual military exercises to advise Taiwan on 
war-fighting issues. To facilitate supervision, coordination and cooperation 
between Washington and Taiwan's defence forces, the Ministry of National 
Defence (Taiwan) formed a unified window or coordination unit dubbed the 
US-Taiwan Military Cooperation Group on 1 May 2002 under Vice 
Admiral Lee Hai-tung. With US assistance, the quality of the ROC armed 
forces has increased over the years. Swaine (2004: 10) claims that the 
individual ROC front-line military units are "well respected, their operators 
well trained" — "in some notable cases, [they function] at a higher level of 
readiness, and the equipment on major weapons platforms such as surface 
ships is well maintained (Central News Agency 2003)". The US position 
was that weapon sales and military assistance to Taiwan was the right thing 
to do to balance the power that favours freedom and ensure adequate 
defence for Taiwan as required by US domestic law. As Assistant Secretary 
of Defence Peter Rodman told the US House of Representatives on 21 April 
2004: 
 
The Presiden's National Security Strategy, published in 
September 2002, calls for "building a balance of power that 
favours freedom". Taiwan's evolution into a true multi-party 
democracy over the past decade is proof of the importance of 
America's commitment to Taiwan's defence. It strengthens 
American resolve to see Taiwan's democracy grow and prosper 
(Tkacik 2005).  
 
Taiwan's own commitment to strengthening its military and defence 
power and establishing a new Taiwanese identity over the years further 
challenged China's desire for reunification with Taiwan. In the mid 1990s, 
Taiwan committed a total of USD12.5 billion to arms imports, making itself 
second only to Saudi Arabia on the list of top arms purchasers (McClaran 
2000). Taiwan had acquired arms and weapons from as many as twenty 
                                                 
5
  One such simulation was carried out in April 2005. A computer-simulated war game confirmed that 
Taiwan’s naval fleet — led by US-built Kidd-Class destroyers — could hold on for at least two weeks in 
the event of a mainland Chinese attack. The five-day simulation test observed that a Kidd-Class 
destroyer was able to shoot down 19 missiles and 16 Chinese jets before being hit. The Straits Times. 
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countries around the world before many of them succumbed to PRC 
pressure. France, for instance, offered Taiwan advanced weapons and 
equipment, including the Mirage Fighters, before succumbing to PRC 
pressure in 1994. It was reported that the Mirage Fighter 2000-5s, together 
with USA F-16s, and 130 indigenous Ching-Kuo fighters, were capable of 
providing Taiwan's Air Force with "a decisive advantage over China's aged 
but numerically superior People's Liberation Army Air Force" (McClaran 
2000: 625). As was mentioned, Taiwan continued to receive arms and 
weapons from the US. However, owing to the strong opposition from Pan-
Blue legislators who held a majority in Legislative Yuan, the DPP did not 
purchase the complete arms package from the US. The assumption that US 
intervention was probable in the event of a cross-strait conflict further 
contributed to Taiwan's reluctant to approve funding. However, some 
progress was made in May 2003 when Taiwan finally gave the go-ahead to 
purchase four Kidd-class destroyers to enhance its naval capabilities. 
The concern regarding Taiwan's bid for independence escalated when 
Chen Chui-bian won the presidential election in 2000. Chen made a number 
of controversial decisions, such as altering the names of state-owned 
enterprise to emphasise "Taiwan" instead of the "Republic of China", 
inserting the name "Taiwan" into official correspondence from the Foreign 
Ministry and abolishing the symbolically important National Unification 
Council in February 2006. School textbooks were altered to put more 
emphasis on Taiwanese history, while 20th-century Chinese history was 
moved to the foreign history syllabus. In his 2007 New Year message, Chan 
stated that "Taiwan is not a part of China", which further raised China's 
concern regarding the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan 
because of what the mainland calls Taiwan's undeclared policy of  "creeping 
independence" (Chai 2007: 38). Chen's administration took decisive 
measures to reduce the flow of investment from Taiwan to mainland China 
such as controlling the rising price of industrial land, relaxing pollution 
regulations and opening more sectors to the private sector as means of 
slowing down the outflow of investments to the mainland.
6
 Taiwanese firms 
were encouraged to shift some of their investments to Southeast Asian 
nations and India under the "Go South Policy". In January 2006, President 
Chen introduced the "Proactive management, effective liberalisation" policy 
to more actively regulate cross-strait trade. Describing the trade text 
relations between China and Taiwan as "slow suicide". The new policy 
attempted to control high-tech exports of Taiwanese firms to China, 
                                                 
6
  It has been estimated that about 65% of Taiwan's outward foreign direct investment entered the 
mainland, while accumulated direct investments by Taiwanese businessmen have reached around 
USD100 billion. (Clark 2002; Chen 2004). 
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screening product items in investment projects and monitoring and auditing 
China-investing Taiwanese companies to catch investors who had violated 
government rules. The controversial decisions were made despite strong 
protests from the Taiwan business sector and the international observers for 
fear that they would further hinder Taiwan's economic progress. For 
example, US Trade Representative Karan Bhatia warned Taiwan that its 
continued restriction of trade with mainland China would put the island at a 
"distinct competitive advantage" (The Straits Times 2006). 
As Taiwan was democratised, its relations with mainland China 
became more unpredictable and dangerous. Kowtowing to the Chinese or 
agreeing to reunification is political suicide for any politicians vying for 
positions. In the 2000 presidential election, the three major candidates vying 
for the post were against the mainland's proposal of "one country, two 
systems" and formally positioned the ROC as an independent sovereign 
state and not a part of the mainland (Sheng 2001). They supported Lee 
Teng-hui's two-states theory, which pronounced Taiwan as an independent 
nation-state separated from the mainland. During his 2008 election 
campaign, Ma Ying-jeou famously pronounced the three "no's formula: no 
unification, no independence and no armed conflicts. Indeed, after decades 
living as second-class citizens, first under the Japanese (from 1895–1945) 
and then under the Kuomintang, the natives in Taiwan desired greater 
control of their own destiny. The growth of an independent Taiwanese 
identity ("Taiwanese-ness") was profound. For example, by December 
2008, survey data found that 51% of the island’s citizens identified 
themselves as exclusively Taiwanese, while 41% called themselves 
Taiwanese and Chinese. Only 5% of the respondents described themselves 
as exclusively Chinese (Shlapak et al. 2009: xiv). Lieberthal (2005: 59) 
points out that if independence is judged by a country's own people 
accepting the view that "they are a distinctive community constituting an 
independent political entity", then Taiwan has already won the game 
because there is a widespread and growing sense of independent identity on 
the island. 
In summary, a combination of US reinforcement and Taiwan 
initiatives to strengthen its military capabilities and promote an independent 
identity have imposed a threat on mainland China with regard to possible 
secession. Whether the secession threat can be sustained and cultivated has 
remained something of a moot question. However, if nothing is to be done 
and the threat becomes real, Chinese leaders run the risk of being labelled as 
lishi zuiren (a person condemned by history) for failing to prevent the 
separation of Taiwan from China. In this regard, it may be argued that in 
passing the Anti-Secession law, President Hu Jintao has left a positive mark 
IJAPS, Vol. 6, No. 2 (July 2010)   The Balance of Power in the Taiwan Strait 
82 
on China's history, demonstrating his willingness to commit himself to the 
use of force if things turn out badly. 
 
 
CHINA'S POSITION 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that US military assistance to Taiwan tilted the 
balance of power toward the US-Taiwan alliance. Because of its large 
physical size and military power, China is less afraid of Taiwan, but it may 
lose in a military confrontation if the US decides to defend the island. US 
total military expenditure recently accounted for nearly half the global 
figure, rising 12% in 2004 to USD455 billion. This was more than the 
combined total for the 32 next most powerful nations. China ranked fifth at 
USD35.4 billion.
7
 To some observers, it seems that even a strong likelihood 
of losing the battle would not stop the Chinese from fighting. For example, 
Henry Kissinger (1996: C7) asserted that "Whatever the cost, China will 
fight rather than give up what it considers Chinese territory". The Chinese 
fixation on Taiwan, as Susan Shirk (2007: 185–86) explains, is largely 
cultivated in school textbooks and the media, which depict cross-strait 
relations as a "morality tale about China's exploitation by foreign powers 
(Japan and the US) during its period of weakness'. Shirk predicts that the 
"century of humiliation" will not end "until China is strong enough to 
achieve reunification". Hence, destroying two US aircrafts and losing ten in 
the process will appear a victory to the Chinese if it is meant to fight for the 
cause of preserving Chinese national honour. Chu (1996: 100) puts the point 
this way: 
 
They (the Chinese) know well that if they fight the world's sole 
superpower — especially a naval and air war in the Western 
Pacific — they would be at a disadvantage. However, the 
Chinese also know that today's China does have the capability 
to destroy some American troops, ships and aircraft, including 
aircraft carriers, in this region of the Western Pacific. For the 
Chinese, bravery in fighting a superpower when that power 
tries to bully China would itself constitute a victory; destroying 
two major ships would become a victory, no matter whether our 
opponents destroy eight or ten of our ships at the same time. 
 
                                                 
7
  Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute http://www.sipri.org (accessed 9 
June 2005). 
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There are others who have argued that China would not pick a fight 
with Taiwan (and the US) because of its preoccupation with economic 
growth.
8
 Historically, however, this logic has been proven wrong in some 
cases. Germany, for instance, was growing rapidly by 1939, and yet Hitler 
started World War II. Likewise, Japan was enjoying rapid economic growth, 
and yet it started the conflict in Asia. As realists like Mearsheimer (2005) 
have pointed out, there are obviously other factors that are more important 
than economic considerations — like preserving sovereignty and territorial 
integration — and that may result in military confrontation, even when it 
hurts the participating states economically. The strong economic relations 
argument has also been rejected by Copeland (1996), who postulates that 
low expectations of future trade between states might provide leaders with a 
good reason to go to war so as to secure long-term security. One hastens to 
note that politicised economic management to restrict economic cooperation 
between the two economies, such as in Chen's 2004 "proactive management, 
effective liberalisation" initiative, may lead the other party to think that 
further economic gains can no longer be exploited to secure long-term 
economic security.  
The passage of the Anti-Secession law was the Chinese's way of 
formalising their long-held position: a commitment to protecting China's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity even by means of non-peaceful 
measures. It formalised China's position concerning its relations with 
Taiwan: that it would not tolerate secession but would welcome 
reunification. It was also a means of "passing the ball to the Taiwanese side 
of the court", of saying that "we, the Chinese have made our position clear; 
now let us wait and see what can be done to improve cross-strait relations". 
As Shirk (2007: 205) puts it, the law serves to "legislate (China's) legal 
riposte to Taiwan's referendum (and to the US Taiwan Relations Act)", a 
law that would look "strong to the public, Taiwan, and the United States 
without tying Beijing's hands and awaking away all its wiggle room". To 
enhance security for the Chinese state, the Anti-Secession Law prepares for 
the best outcome (the reunification of Taiwan and mainland China) and 
avoids the worst-case scenario (Taiwanese independence).  
 How likely is it that the US will intervene and defend Taiwan if it is 
attacked? Brzezinski (2005) thinks that it is probable that the US would 
protect Taiwan. He warns, "…any Chinese military planner has to take into 
account the likelihood that even if China could overrun Taiwan, the US 
would enter the conflict. That prospect vitiates any political calculus 
                                                 
8
  At the beginning of the 21st century, almost 75% of China′s information technology exports came from 
Taiwan (Clark 2002: 756). 
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justifying military cooperation until and unless the US is out of the picture. 
And the United States will not be out of the picture for a long, long time" 
(emphasis added). Chu (1996) thinks likewise, nothing that Taiwan′s 
embracing of the democratic system should attract the attention and support 
of Americans, who would compel their government to do something. 
However, it is fair to say that the US insists on the peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue. If this is not possible, a status quo of non-unification and non-
independence ought to be maintained. The US administration since Nixon 
has been willing to accommodate China's preference for having the US 
government push Taiwan toward reunification or at least stop it from 
moving further toward legal independence. Washington's position — as 
articulated in the Taiwan Relations Act — is that Beijing cannot expect the 
US to stand still if China attacks Taiwan. Similarly, Taiwan cannot count on 
US forces to protect the island regardless of the circumstances that cause the 
fight.  
If a war between China and the US occurs, will the Chinese be 
defeated? The military and defensive strengths and weaknesses at play are 
subtle as one party has exclusive possession of own information unknown to 
others. This provides one reason for the Chinese to expand their military 
capabilities, knowing that they could spring (un)pleasant surprises on their 
opponent(s) and emerge as victors. Chinese strategists have consistently 
expressed confidence that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could pose a 
serious challenge to US forces in a conflict over Taiwan considering the 
geographical constraints faced by the opponent and the solid historical 
record of the PLA in fighting superior opponents during the Chinese 
revolution. Although its improved capabilities would enable the PLA to 
better contend with US forces, the PLA′s war-fighting capabilities remain 
uncertain (the PLA has not fought a war since 1979). From the perspective 
of realism, the uncertainty leads to an endless struggle for power. When 
China perceived that the balance of power was not balanced but rather was 
tilted in favour of a US-Taiwan alliance, China struck back with the passage 
of the Anti-Secession law. The Chinese knew that the law would not be 
looked at seriously if China did not have the necessary military might, 
particularly against a great power like the US. Hence, it was logical for the 
Chinese to expand its military capabilities. And when China did that, it was 
Taiwan's turn to feel uneasy, fearing that the balance of power had become 
imbalanced, this time in favour of China. This led to the US's offering more 
and better-quality arms and weapons to Taiwan. In the presence of 
asymmetric information concerning military capabilities, both parties are 
stuck in the "poker game" or "game of chess" in which one party has to 
guess what the other party has in its possession and the next move.  
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Based on published materials, it would seem that the strength of the 
Chinese military and defence is indeed impressive (Moore 2000; Bitzinger 
2004; Cole 2004; Chai 2007; Shirk 2007; Lee 2008; Shlapak et al. 2009). 
China's nuclear arsenal is estimated at 400 warheads. Dong Feng -5 (DF-5) 
liquid-fuelled missiles have a range of 13,000 kilometres and are capable of 
covering all of Asia and Europe and most of the US. The missile tests 
conducted in 1996 by the Chinese in conjunction with Taiwan's presidential 
election impressed the West regarding its capabilities. As McClaran (2000: 
633) commented, "The Chinese exercises of March 1996 demonstrated 
China's postulated military strength in this regards… The planning and 
execution of the 1996 exercises revealed an operational sophistication 
hitherto unseen in Chinese forces". China also has a considerable inventory 
of short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. One thousand four 
hundred of them are aimed at Taiwan, with 50–70 missiles added every 
year. A recent study by the Rand Corporation concluded that the missiles 
launched by China were capable of destroying all of the aircrafts parked on 
ramps in the open, allowing China a long enough time frame to launch a 
large-scale air raid on Taiwan and destroy the aircraft parked in the shelter 
(Shlapak et al. 2009).   
China has an estimated of 2.5 million personnel in its military 
excluding the numerous reserves and paramilitary units. The Chinese navy 
— People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) — has accumulated a significant 
number of submarines; the ratio of Chinese to Taiwanese submarines is 
probably fifty-to-four. Between 1995 and 2002, China was reported to have 
imported some USD9.3 billion worth of arms, mostly from Russia. In fact, 
the Chinese have signed arms import agreements in excess of USD11 billion 
since 1999. In 2002 alone, China purchased USD3.6 billion worth of foreign 
weapons. China's spending on procurements accounts for about one-third of 
the country's total defence budget as compared to merely 20% in Taiwan, 
and China's defence budget has more than doubled in real terms since the 
mid 1990s with an annual average of 15.4% until 2005 (in nominal terms). 
In 2004, China spent USD25 billion on defence-related items. This 
represented an 11.6% increase over the previous year and continued an 
eight-year trend of double-digit real increases in Chinese military spending. 
Besides importing arms, China is capable of producing them domestically, 
and this will add at least 300 more modern fighter aircrafts to its fleet, as 
well as up to 24 new diesel-electric or nuclear-powered attack submarines 
and more than 40 medium and heavy amphibious lift ships by the year 2010. 
The ambitious outer space program since the launching of China's first anti-
satellite missile into space in 1997 has also offered China significant 
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knowledge in the areas of missile technology and space-related weapons 
systems.  
China's decision to build-up its military capability is a natural course 
of action from the realist point of view. In relative terms, Chinese military 
capabilities are still weaker than those of the US. However, the Chinese are 
catching up fast and are expected to continue to modernise and expand their 
military capabilities as a natural consequence of their economic growth.  
 
 
FIFTH YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE ANTI-SECESSION LAW 
 
Five years have passed since the passage of the Anti-Secession law. The 
status quo of there being no unification and no independence has been 
maintained across the strait. Whether this was attributed to the law itself is 
not easy to ascertain. It may be argued that even without the bill, the status 
quo would have been maintained because Taiwanese support for de jure 
independence has remained relatively weak as compared to support for the 
maintenance of the status quo without either independence for Taiwan or 
reunification with China.
9
 However, the cross-strait region remains unstable 
as the three actors — China, USA and Taiwan — continue to expand their 
military might and express their willingness to enter into military 
confrontation over the Taiwan issue. That the situation across the Taiwan 
Strait is tense but stable, paving the way for China and Taiwan to work out 
their differences and pursue their economic growth paths. China continues 
to progress towards economic powerhouse status in the context of the global 
financial crisis that began in 2008 and seeks to engage economically with 
Taiwan. For example, only a month after the Anti-Secession law was 
passed, KMT Chairman Lien Chan was warmly welcomed during his visit 
to China. During Lien's visit from 16 April to 3 May 2005, the Chinese 
agreed to open their market to 15 types of Taiwanese fruits and drop the ban 
on Chinese tourists visiting the island. The visit of People First Party (PFP) 
representative James Soong to China a month later (from 5 May to 12 May 
2005) brought similar good news for the Taiwanese, with the Chinese side 
agreeing to work towards direct cross-strait flights and towards simplifying 
via procedures for Taiwanese businesses in China.  
  
                                                 
9
  For example, maintaining the status quo was the preferred choice for 50.1% of the respondents in the 
December 2009 opinion poll conducted by the Global Views Survey Research Centre. 23.9% of the 
respondents supported Taiwan's independence, while 7.4% supported reunification with China 
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=114&anum=7376 (accessed 4 January 
2009).  
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China knows that Taiwan cannot seek independence without aid from 
outside. Internationally, no major country in the world recognises Taiwan as 
a sovereign nation. Foreign interference runs the risk of generating a 
nationalist reaction from the Chinese people concerning their colonial past. 
Nationalism also gives China the force to react vigorously to Taiwan′s 
efforts to obtain independence. Independence for Taiwan in this regard can 
come from constitutional change and/or support from a powerful nation 
such as the US that is willing and able to oppose mainland China. There has 
not been strong support for constitutional change, as demonstrated in Chen′s 
repeated but failed attempts at referendums. The US supports Taiwan, as 
was mentioned in the early section, although the real question of whether 
the US would come to Taiwan's assistance remains unclear and 
geographically difficult to answer because of the longer distance between 
the US and Taiwan relative to that between China and Taiwan. Hence, it is 
not surprising that despite the economic stimulus offered to Taiwan, China 
has not renounced the possibility of using force to reunite with Taiwan as 
stipulated in the Anti-Secession law. Instead, the passage of the law has 
given Beijing more room to take a soft line towards Taiwan to prevent 
changes in the Taiwanese constitution: no matter how soft China's stand is, 
the red line has been drawn in the Anti-Secession bill and cannot be 
misread. 
Since the election of Ma Ying-Jeou in May 2008 as the President of 
Taiwan, economic relations between China and Taiwan have strengthened. 
Ma has made it clear that he will remove barriers to improve economic 
relations with Beijing, including in a call for a cross-strait "common 
market". His approach in dealing with the Taiwan issue has appeared to 
enjoy popular support; he achieved 58.5% of the votes in the presidential 
election. This came after his party, the KMT, captured 53.5% of the vote 
and 81 out of 113 seats in Taiwan's national parliament, the Legislative 
Yuan. Following Ma′s inauguration, direct air and sea links were established 
to remove the tedious and costly practice of routing passengers and goods 
via a third place such as Hong Kong or Macau. Launched in December 
2008, the arrangement links eight Taiwan and 21 Chinese cities, with up to 
108 return passenger flights allowed on a daily basis each week. 60 cargo 
flights a month are also permitted. In March 2009, China and Taiwan agreed 
to trade talks, including the possibility of signing free trade style deals. This 
was part of the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) that Taiwan was actively promoting, not only to overcome the 
recession during the global downturn but also to maintain Taiwan's 
competitiveness following a chain of free trade agreements between China 
and her neighbouring countries. In June 2009, President Ma announced a 
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key initiative, that of allowing Chinese companies to invest in 100 
categories of local businesses, including computer components, cell phones, 
car-making and the building of resort hotels and commercial ports. These 
initiativse reverse the largely one-way investment flows from Taiwan to 
China.  
 Despite the improved relationships at play, a significant change either 
towards unification or towards Taiwan's independence is unlikely in the 
near term. It is true that mainland China could take advantage of the more 
flexible government under Ma to reunify with Taiwan. However, to do so, 
China would have to do more than grant economic concessions. In March 
2009, China's Premier Wen Jiabao told members of the Chinese National 
People's Congress that China was ready for talk on political and military 
issues related to Taiwan. "In the coming year, we will continue to adhere to 
the principle of developing cross-strait relations and promoting peaceful 
reunification of the motherland… We are ready to hold talks on cross-strait 
political and military issues and create conditions for ending the state of 
hostility and concluding a peace agreement" (Today 2009). However, the 
Chinese insistence that the Taiwan side has to agree on the One-China 
principle discourages many Taiwanese politicians from taking the next step. 
China has also yet to entertain Ma's requests for membership in international 
organisations such as the United Nations and World Health Organization 
and for the removal of missile heads pointing at the island. While a high-
level meeting between the two presidents is not impossible, both sides 
recognise that a gradual (rather than abrupt) relationship is the right thing to 
present here in the cross-strait context. Treatments based on national 
differences are generally embedded in the various groups, compounded by 
Chen's effort to portray the Taiwanese as a separate ethnic group with a very 
limited relationship to Chinese culture.  
While Ma is commonly portrayed as China-friendly in the media, the 
Chinese have been cautious. The Chinese knew that Ma's preference is to 
maintain the status quo and protect Taiwan's interests. Ma was more willing 
to cooperate with China in the economic arena because of its vested interest 
in providing jobs for the people and at least retaining Taiwan's 
competitiveness in the global economy. Reunification was considered low 
priority. For instance, during his election campaigns, Ma vowed to protect 
Taiwan's interests and preserve Taiwan's de-facto political independence as 
the ROC. Ma regarded reunification with China as merely one of many 
possible decisions, and the solution had to be determined through a 
democratic progress. He commented that reunification would not be 
possible with a non-democratic PRC (Rigger 2008). On 18 March 2008, Ma 
issued a statement saying that "ROC is a sovereign independent democratic 
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state. The future of Taiwan should be decided by Taiwan's 23 million 
people, and no intervention by the PRC is to be tolerated". Responding to 
Premier Wen Jiabao's assertion that mainland China should have a say in 
Taiwan's status, Ma called such an assertion "not only rude, irrational, 
arrogant, and absurd, but also self-righteous" (quoted in Rigger, 2008, p. 
692). When the Chinese mainland's top Taiwan envoy, Chen Yulin, arrived 
in Taiwan for a five-day visit from 20 December to 24 December 2009 to 
hold trade talks with Taiwan's representative, Chiang Pin-kung, Ma quickly 
assured the Taiwanese that no trade pacts would be formally signed during 
the talks and that Taiwan's "sovereignty and interests" would be jealously 
guarded. This came after tens of thousands gathered in central Taiwan to 
protest against the trade talks, fearing that the outcome of the talks would be 
an influx of cheaper Chinese goods and competition for jobs. 
The protection of Taiwan's interests would be increasingly more 
demanding as elections dates drew nearer. Ma′s dwindling popularity in 
Taiwan did not help. A poll by TVBS conducted one month after Ma's 
inauguration revealed a significant drop in satisfaction with Ma's 
administration, with 66% of the respondents stating that Ma and his officials 
had not adequately prepared themselves to deal with various crises, 
including that of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands
10
 (45% of the respondents 
were dissatisfied with Ma's handling of the island issue, while only 38% 
were satisfied) and inflation, including rising oil and food prices (58% of the 
respondents were dissatisfied, while only 31% were satisfied) (Jacobs 2008: 
471). Ma was severely criticised for his slow and messy response to the 
Morakot typhoon, which hit Taiwan in August 2009 with devastating 
consequences.  It was strongly perceived that quicker deployment of relief 
workers would have saved more lives.
11
 To boost his ratings, Ma approved 
                                                 
10
 Mainland China, Japan and Taiwan claim ownership of the tiny group of islands known as the Diaoyu 
Islands in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese. Located approximately midway between Taiwan and the 
southernmost island of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands, the Diaoyu Islands caused a dispute that began in 
the early 1970s following offshore oil exploration and the prediction of hydrocarbon deposits around the 
islands. From China's standpoint, the islands were ceded to Japan in May 1895 together with Taiwan 
following China's loss in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895, and therefore, they should revert to China 
when China resumes its sovereignty over Taiwan and its adjacent islands. Japan, on the other hand, 
claims that the islands were never ceded to them under the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895 but were 
incorporated into Japan as terra nullius months before China ceded Taiwan to Japan under the treaty. 
Taiwan's position was that the Japanese should have over the islands to Taiwan. Pro-independence 
groups led by DPP regard the islands as part of their founding mythology — their demonstrations over 
the islands were significant in the early period of the democracy movement in Taiwan. The KMT-
inspired "Protect the Diaoyutai Movement" (bao diaoyutai yindong) represents a major movement 
aiming to advocate for this cause and attack the government whenever the latter failed to properly 
represent Taiwan's national interest. For useful discussions of the dispute, see Deans (2000) and 
Weigand (2009).  
11
 With more than 700 deaths reported, the cabinet ministers, including Premier Lin Chao-shiuan, quit in 
September 2009 to take responsibility for the disaster. 
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the Dalai Lama's five-day visit to Taiwan to comfort the typhoon victims, 
fearing that if he said "no" to the invitation by DPP's Mayor Chen Chu, the 
opposition would attack him for kowtowing to China — a damning 
accusation at the time, when his approval ratings were at a record low. 
China responded to the visit by scrapping ribbon-cutting ceremonies to 
mark new destinations for direct cross-strait flights and visits by Chinese 
delegations to Taiwan. 
What are the implications of all of this for China? As far as 
unification is concerned, it is not the right time for China to press Taiwan 
too forcefully regarding its demands. Doing so would put Ma in a tough 
position in terms of reconciling the interests of the Taiwanese, who prefer 
Taiwan to retain its political independence, and those of the Chinese. The 
CCP must recognise that the DPP is still a force to be reckoned with — as 
indicated, for example, in its by-election victories in Taoyuan, Taitung and 
Taichung counties in early January 2010. China must take into consideration 
the possibility that Ma might not be re-elected in 2012. Granting too many 
concessions to Ma’s administration both in the economic and political 
contexts might backfire because retracting the concessions later would 
display Chinese political leaders in a negative light. However, failure to 
reach an agreement during Ma's time may further delay any possibility of 
uniting the different components of the motherland because China is in a 
better position in dealing with China-friendly Ma than it would be if 
someone from the DPP were in power. In short, China's desire to reunite 
with Taiwan is unlikely to be fulfilled in the near term. Without 
reunification, there is always the possibility of Taiwan's bidding for 
independence. China has made its position known and has clarified the 
reactions that might be possible should Taiwan seek independence in this 
manner. In this regard, the Anti-Secession law serves to restore the balance 
of power across the Taiwan Strait for the security and national interest of the 
Chinese. It remains imperative for China to maintain but not upset the 
balance of power. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper argues that the passage of the Anti-Secession law in March 2005 
was a logical step forward by the Chinese to restore what they perceive as 
an imbalance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Our analyses of US-Taiwan 
relations and Taiwan's own commitment to establishing a new Taiwanese 
identity have suggested that Taiwan has gained the upper hand with regard 
to the Taiwan issue. The Balance of Power theory has provided a suitable 
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theoretical explanation for the Chinese desire to expand its military 
capabilities and push ahead with the Anti-Secession bill. The theory 
anticipates China's goal, which is to avoid the worst-case scenario (Taiwan's 
independence). At least for now, China does not want to pick a fight with 
Taiwan without the full assurance of its winning the battle. Interestingly, the 
US has similarly adopted a defensive approach. The US logic is that peace 
must come from a balance of power, with offers of arms and weapons to 
Taiwan considered an essential means of maintaining the balance of power 
across the Taiwan Strait. In this regard, it can be said that US inconsistency 
regarding the One-China policy helps to maintain the status quo. Any clarity 
on the US position may not serve the US purpose well (i.e., that of seeking a 
peaceful resolution to the Taiwan conflict) because it may seem to indicate 
that the US is "taking sides", which would likely distort the balance of 
power.  
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APPENDIX 
 
The Anti-Secession Law 
 
Article 1 
This law is formulated, in accordance with the Constitution, for the purpose of 
opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name 
of "Taiwan independence", promoting peaceful national reunification, maintaining 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits, preserving China's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and safeguarding the fundamental interests of the Chinese nation. 
Article 2 
There is only once China in the world. Both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one 
China. China's sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division. Safeguarding 
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is the common obligation of all Chinese 
people, the Taiwan compatriots included. Taiwan is part of China. The State shall 
never allow the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede 
from China under any name or by any means. 
Article 3 
The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil law of the late 1940s. 
Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's internal 
affair, which subjects to no interference by any outside forces. 
Article 4 
Accomplishing the great task of reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all 
Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included. 
Article 5 
Upholding the principle of one China is the basis of peace reunification of the 
country. To unify the country through peaceful means best serves the fundamental 
interests of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The State shall do its 
utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful reunification. After the country 
is reunified peacefully, Taiwan may practice systems different from those on the 
mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy 
Article 6 
The State shall take the following measures to maintain peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Straits and promote cross-Straits relations: (i) to encourage and facilitate 
personal exchanges across the Straits for greater mutual understanding, (ii) to 
encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and co-operation, (iii) to encourage and 
facilitate cross-Straits exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health 
and sports, (iv) to encourage and facilitate cross Straits co-operation in combating 
crimes and (v) to encourage and facilitate cross-Straits other activities that are 
conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. The State protects the rights 
and interests of the Taiwan compatriots in accordance with law. 
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Article 7 
The State stands for the achievement of peaceful reunification through consultations 
and negotiations on an equal footing between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. 
These consultations and negotiations may be conducted in steps and phases and with 
flexible and varied modalities. The two sides of the Taiwan Straits may consult and 
negotiate on the following matters: (i) officially ending the state of hostility between 
the two sides, (ii) mapping out the development of cross-Straits relations, (iii) steps 
and arrangements for peaceful national reunification, (iv) the political status of the 
Taiwan authorities, (v) the Taiwan region′s room of international operation that is 
compatible with it status, and (vi) other matters concerning the achievement of 
peaceful national reunification. 
Article 8 
In the event that the "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces act under any name 
or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major 
incidences entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or than possibilities 
for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ 
non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. The State Council and the Central Military Commission shall 
decide on and execute the non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as 
provided for in the preceding paragraph and shall promptly report to the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress. 
Article 9 
In the event of employing and executing non-peaceful means and other necessary 
measures as provided for in this Law, the State shall exert its utmost to protect the 
rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign nationals in Taiwan, and 
minimize loses. At the same time, the State shall protect the rights and interests of the 
Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China in accordance with law. 
Article 10 
This law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation. 
 
Notes: Adopted at the Third Session of the 10th National People's Congress on 14 March 2005 
